7.30.2009

Chapter 2: Part Two (Electric Boogaloo)

Alrighty, where did we leave off?

Fareed has identified an interesting little quip about our modern society. He states that for the last two decades right up until now, we've spent the lion's share of our time preparing for disasters and worrying about crisis...hurricanes, nuclear proliferation, economic breakdowns and the like. However, the obsession with the gloom and doom has caused us to become largely unprepared for many of the largest problems that we face which are infact "the product of success and not that of failure" [1].

An important fact that Fareed mentions is to think of China and India as global deflation machines. The boom within these respective countries has generally allowed goods and services to be cheap, which keeps inflation curbed and interest rates low. This was briefly mentioned in the last post and guess what? Yes, these two factors contributed largely to global growth and the accumulation of capital. With the accumulation of capital and investments, the financial and economic sectors of the world (especially the rest) grew in complexity and diversity which has given them greater resiliance in downturns (part of the 'stronger' foundation that I mentioned previously.)

Another interesting element to the mix is the fact that in this decade, oil prices have risen due to a sharp increase in world demand, especially from develping countries (well...not just because of growing demand...but it is a significant factor.) Increasing demand means economies are growing and therefore, their expansion will allow them more flexibility to handle increased costs. In other words, the 400-some percent increase in oil in this decade, while insane, was digested much easier because it was caused by economic growth rather than price manipulation. The price increases in oil from 1973-1974 and 1978-1979 were less than 100% in both cases, and yet the artificial price manipulation caused recessions to develop. All of that being said, it is partially true to state that the price surge of 2008 did contribute to factors of the 2009 recession, but there were many other contributors that were not present during earlier recessions, and the conclusion that because of growing demand, economies were more able to deal with price increases does hold merit.

Unfortunately, other commodoties are at record prices during due to shortage of supply and growing demand [2]. This fact will ultimately contribute to the end of the era of low inflation and stability (which, more than a year after publishing, we have seen this begin to happen.)

The problems of plenty are most noticeable in their impact on resource supply and the environment. Population booms are requiring increased crop yields that currently do not appear to be sustainable in the long run. Additionally, our ability to conserve water resources has been incredibly lacking. Fareed points out that historically, people tend to migrate to where there is water, which could potentially mean hundreds of millions of refugees migrating and crowding of supplies that are increasingly scarce. Much as oil has been a source of geopolitical tension in the past century, the same can be said for water and as a result, the coming era will be defined by shortages in water and food. Fareed ends the section with a startling figure. To feed their growth, China and India will be constructing 800 coal fired generating stations between 2006 and 2012 with combined Carbon Dioxide emissions that amount to 5 times the amount of the proposed reduction of the Kyoto accord [3].

The organization of our world in the last twenty odd years has been described as "uni-multipolarity" by Samuel Huntington; a rather strange term that accurately describes our current era. The 'uni' credits the United States, the world's only remaining super power, however, there are many emerging powers within the world as well...whether they be nation states (propelled by the rise of the Rest or Natural Resources), trade blocs (such as the European Union) or Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's, such as GreenPeace). The rise in these groups goes hand in hand with the rise of the Rest, in what Fareed documents as the correlating rise of Nationalism and is central to the main challenge of the rise of the Rest - "to stop the forces of global growth from turning into the forces of global disorder and disintegration" [4].
Nationalism, especially the current brand faced with the rise of the Rest, is a rather messy subject and draws its sources from many sociocultural elements. One element that I'd like to touch upon is the feeling of anger in many non-Western countries at being forced to accept a Western or American way of doing things. One very illustrated example that Fareed uses to explain his point is the historical narative of World War II that is forced upon the rest of the world. Fareed uses the example of historian Stephen Ambrose who writes exhaustively of the Allied invasion of Sicily which exiled 60,000 Axis soldiers. However, this Sicilian invasion is peanuts compared to the battle of Kursk, which is the largest land battle in modern (and probably all of) history with between 1.5 and 2 million Soviet and Nazi infrantry participating in combat operations ending with a decisive strategic victory for the Red Army...and yet in many historical accounts there is very little mention of this battle even though it occured during the same time as the Sicilian invasion that Ambrose writes so passionately about. This specific case serves as a broader example that historians commonly paint World War II as a battle between Nazi Germany and the Forces of British and American soldiers...even though the Eastern Front was where Germany saw three quarters of its casualties. In general, the conflict can be more accurately described as "Stalin's War" and in the grand scheme of things, the Western Front was little more than a sideshow to the European Theatre. The example is very specific but speaks to a number cases where the non-Western world is forced to accept a Western view. This anger with the West is being fuelled and propelled by the rising importance of the Rest as well as the increasing wealth, influence and geopolitical power that these countries are now recognizing. These forces then (in part) fuel the nationalist pride that we are seeing a resurgence of through out the world. Many of these countries are now actually able to reject the Western view of all things, from historical accounts to business deals and practices and, due in part to globalization and increased interdependance, the West is no longer really in a place where they can reject these countries and as such, the West is no longer 'the centre' of the world.


Traditionally, many of the problems faced by our world are rarely contained by national borders and as such, nations have often had to come together in order to solve them. UN resolutions and peacekeeping, climate change, space travel and so on. With the emergence of so many more 'players' with say on the national circuit, many fuelled by a nationalistic pride to no longer be bossed around and controlled by the West, our world faces a central crisis that is one of the largest problems of mass globalization and the rise of the Rest. How are we going to come together to solve problems? The answer to this question is complex and requires further discussion and analysis of the problems at hand, which is slightly out of the scope of the P-AW. However, it is much easier to say "put aside our differences and work together" than to do.

Along with the decline of our uni-polar world into a uni-multipolar world, we should expect that the United States will lose some of its economic control within the global market. This has been happening for some time (outsourcing, for example) and the transition to a service based economy (mentioned in the previous post) and this has actually helped the American bottom line...which is actually a little unexpected. This fact serves to reinforce a point about the future role for America in the post-American world.

As Fareed puts it, this is "not a zero-sum game" and as other countries see their roles and economies expand, the pie in general does expand. In order for nations to come together in this post-American world and to deter rogue nations, the United States must realize that it can no longer act unilaterally (Unprovoked invasions and occupations of countries in defiance of the UN Security Council aren't very kosher now...they weren't ever really kosher, but especially not now.) In order to face the biggest challenge of the rise of the Rest, the United States, as the dominator of the current world order, must show that it is willing to compromise and allow other nations to become stake holders in the new world order, an idea that Fareed is very passionate about [4]. He states that this is the central challenge to American foreign policy in the coming decades. However, there is another paradoxical obstacle to the rise of the Rest that America must successfully triump over in order for mass globalization to continue peacefully.


As mentioned earlier in the blog, this globalization and the rise of the Rest are chiefly, directly, 100% the result of American foreign policies and practices from previous decades. The implementation of ultra-con(servative) economic practices at the hands of the "Chicago Boys" of Milton Friedman in the Southern Cone in the 1970's, although tragic in their own right (word on the street is that Pinochet wasn't such a good guy) have finally allowed for the opening up and integration of these economies into the global order and in many cases (and more importantly) with a form of democratic socialism that actually works! The stiff monetary policy that the IMF forced down the throat of many of the "Asian Tigers" later on in history had its benefits too...although I don't agree with the methods in which the IMF forced their policy onto these countries nor do I agree with the conditions that the IMF and WorldBank forced onto countries in crisis (The Washington Consensus, carrying of debt, privitizationm etc), one cannot argue that elements of the Washington Consensus and IMF monetary policy did contribute (in some countries, much later than the population would have hoped) to the economic growth of the country, along with the global taming of inflation and the economic boom of globalization.

Okay...so after decades of America telling countries what to do, some of them are actually doing it and things are more or less goin' alright...what's the biggie?

Thing is, there's a feeling festering in America, right now, that threatens to destroy the competitiveness America will have in the post-American world and in some cases, even tear the country apart [5]. Like so many other problems, this one is also rather multifaceted, but is contributed in part to an irresponsible political culture within the Americas. The attitude in Washington D.C. is one of smug, arrogant-'out of touch-ness' with the rest of the world and it threatens Americas very standing within the world order. Although, to some degree, this is changing (Respect, Barack and democrat control of both houses), America's reputation on the world stage has taken a beating and no longer can America claim the moral high ground on any issue. The attitudes of regular American citizen "Joe Everyman" are becoming increasingly negative towards foreign companies, immigration, and even the freedoms that America once stood and bled for. All of this ties back into America's position within the post-American world, and its role and responsibility to encourage compromise within the rising powers of the world.

Two quotes by Fareed that really speak to me, and then i'll leave chapter two alone.

1) "On an issue where the United States has been a model for the world [immigration], the country has regressed toward an angry defensive crouch."

2) The United States succeeded in its great and historic mission - it globalized the world. But along the way (...) it forgot to globalize itself" [6].

References:

F. Zakaria The Post-American World, New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 2008
[1] Pp 27
[2] Pp 28
[3] Pp 31
[4] Pp 44
[5] Pp 46
[6] Pp 48

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