Chapter 4: The Challenger (Earth Angel, Earth Angel!)

So I made the mistake of taking a mid-afternoon nap (I'm notorious for that) and now it's 1 in the morning and I can't sleep. The solution? BLOG!!

Since I'm feeling just a tad nostalgic at the moment, please allow me to take you back to a much cherished and awkward time of my younger years... The Jr. High afterschool dance!! (Just so you know, I'm actually going somewhere with this...so just roll with it!)

It's 4pm and the school gymnasium is looking spiffy; all decked out in streamers and balloons. Everyone is all gussied up in their Sunday best and looking mighty snazzy, but are mostly standing around in their own groups of friends (cutting up the dancefloor wasn't as popular in those days) and for the most part, guys and girls are semi-ignoring each other. The 40-something and balding DJ is spinning out all the latest tracks from "MuchDance 1999" when he decides to mix it up by playing (gasp) a slow dance song! With the music playing in the background (I always think of "Earth Angel" by The Penguins...thanks alot, "Back to the Future!") my eyes glanced across to the other side of the gymnasium, where I soon located the girl that I had a crush on, looking very pretty in her red dress with yellow stars. With fellow students and teachers looking onwards, I awkwardly approached this young lady and asked her to dance (my voice probably cracked, too.) Held apart at arms length (haha, cooties was running rampant at this time too, you see) we slowly danced in circles. Ah, what a magical time it was.

Such an awkward description serves to (loosely) describe events across the world stage today, as Fareed beings the chapter by offering up a description of America's fascination with China and how it exemplifies the rise of the Rest. China has captured America's eye (awwwww) and as China begins to rise within the world stage, the two have become stuck in an awkward never-ending waltz, holding each other at arms length but at the same time, dependent on each other for support.

Fareed uses this chapter to really build on many of the ideas that were established earlier in the book and how the relate to China. Chief among these is the prediction that I made toward the end of chapter 3; that as non-Western countries begin to modernize and enter upon the international stage, they will take a path that is a blend of Western principles and that of their own traditions. Before we can begin to pick this apart, we must first apply a bit of context to the prediction. My good friend Napoleon Bonaparte once famously said "Let China sleep, for when China awakes, she will shake the world" [1]. With an economy that has doubled in size every 8 years over the last 30 and with a vast migration towards urbanization and higher education (the government increased post secondary scholarships and aid to $2.7 billion in 2008, up from $240 million the year before [2]) China is indeed awakening, and the shaking of the world stage is tremendous.

Fareed has very eloquently described the rise of China, so I will directly quote him: "China's awakening is reshaping the economic and political landscape, but it is also being shaped by the world into which it is rising" [3]. Beijing is at the forefront of globalization and nationalization, the two forces that are defining the post-American era, and it is the combined push of these forces that will define how China integrates into the world order. The technological revolution and economic interdependence of globalization are pushing China toward a peaceful integration, yet nationalism fuelled by increasing influence within the world order are producing disruption and a change of the social order within the country. As countries tend to open up to free-markets and globalization, they tend to have a shift toward democracy and these forces are exposing the cracks within the foundation of the country's political structure and the vastness of its cultural diversity (example: the growing tensions between Uyghur nationalists and the Chinese state.) We'll get back to this point shortly, I'd first like to talk more about the predictions made in Chapter 3 and how they relate.

China has more or less become the second most important country in the world when it comes to the rise of the Rest (the first is, for the time being, the United States.) Many 'expert' economists and political scientists have long predicted that in the years since Deng Xiaoping's free market reforms, the forces of capitalism combined with the 'evil's of communism' would collude and contribute to regime collapse, however, China is still a centrally planned Communist state. It is true to say that the free market reforms of China have conflicted somewhat with the state and have produced some tensions and troubles (a solid 90% of China's billionaires are involved with the Communist party...nepotism runs deep! [4].) Thing is, China also has something that the rest of the world would kill for, something that makes all other problems seem much more manageable and much less significant and that is robust growth. When it came time to start reforming China, Beijing was very welcoming and frank on its acceptance of capitalist principles, yet it took an approach far different from "the Washington Consensus" that was advocated by scholars of ultra-conservative economic policy (Jeffery Sachs, Milton Friedman, 'Chicago School' etc) and applied elsewhere in the world. China learned from examples of its own past (the Cultural Revolution) and those of countries that had been previously exposed to free market reforms (Pinochet and 'the Brick' in Chile, Yeltsin blowing up (literally) the Russian parliament in the early 90's and (literally) making himself a ruling Monarch for a year [5]) and instead, opted for an option that had "less shock, more therapy." I'm not saying that the Chinese government has been exactly "easy going" but when compared to history, the Chinese reforms have been relatively peaceful. There are a number of reasons for this.

Beijing, instead of instituting a rapid fire assault of massive changes all at once ('the Brick,' issued by the Chicago Boys in Chile), China has chosen a more incremental approach that, as Fareed puts it, "has grown the denominator" of the economy. Instead of a mass-privatization and shut down of inefficient operations, the government has grown the economy around these inefficient enterprises so that over time, the bad areas became a smaller and smaller part of the Chinese economy, additionally giving the entire system stronger legs to stand on. Only now, in the 21st century, after China has strengthened the rest of its economy, is it able to clean up and reform its banking system and financial sector. Looking through the last decade, we can see an interesting problem arise for Beijing. The 'free-marketization' and opening of China has greatly reduced the centralized control that Beijing has on the rest of China, in a sense, Communism has failed and is continuing to gradually deteriorate in a controlled manor. Karl Marx stated that "when a society changes its economic foundation, the political system that rests upon it will inevitably change as well" [6] and a look at the history books confirms this fact, which has become one of the most important generalizations in political science. We see that dozens of countries throughout the world, from South Korea to Argentina to Turkey have shifted their political structures toward a liberalized democracy as they transformed to market-based economies. China has not yet defied this trend, as they have not yet become a true free-market country, nor have they reached middle income status (on the whole, China is still a poor country) but the push is there and China is very much moving in this direction. A younger generation of communist party members have been studying the political structuring of countries such as Japan and Sweden, to better learn how they have maintained control in liberal democratic-socialist climates and it is understood that the prime challenge of China's globalization movement will be how the communist party weathers the tides of change towards a liberalized democracy and whether it will be a violent, tumultuous transition or a peaceful one.

Stepping back a moment, there is another factor in the unique success of China's free market transformation and this one owes credit to the communist party. Basically, China doesn't have to worry about voters, public opinions or even losing power. China has been able to initiate reforms that may be painful in the short-term, but in the long run are most beneficial to the economic success of the country. The transformation processes in other countries (such as India) are slowed by the need to appease voters with policies that are often unfriendly toward market transformation and globalization (farm subsidies, for example.) As the state slowly starts to become decentralized, it becomes more and more difficult to institute policies as a single ruling party with no 'real' accountability or public responsibility. There is no doubt that the method in which change is created in China will play a significant role in determining if the decentralization of the ruling party in China is peaceful or not, and is something to be watched in the future (again, considering the conflict with ethnic Uyghur nationalists, we can speculate that this may be a nerve-wracking time for both China and the world.) From this, we're faced with an unavoidable question: Does this mean that the extraordinary success of China's reforms are due to the fact that the starting point for these reforms was in a centralized, totalitarian government? Maybe yes, maybe no, but regardless of the answer, it is an interesting phenomenon to observe.

One thing we can be sure of, is that China has been very aware of its rise to power and is very conscious and careful as to how the world perceives it. Essentially, during the first decade of growth, China's "foreign policy" (in quotes because it didn't really have one) was to grow and not ruffle anyone's feathers in the process. Chinese politicians often openly avoid discussing foreign policy or the national agenda and often talk about "a renaissance" in China rather than "a rise to power." To be frank, it's probably not a bad Idea, as China is set to cast one heck of a shadow over the world stage (1.338 billion people (the 2008 CIA World Factbook estimate) will do that). We can be sure that if China did show overly aggressive or imperialistic actions (like Russia has been doing as of late), whether it be over Taiwan or interests in the Kashagan oil field in Kazakhstan or opposition of sanctions against North Korea, it would gain nothing but the resentment and fear of the West, which is just bad for business. The official party line has been that a nation's path, wherever or whoever that nation is, "lies in economic prowess and that militarism, empire and aggression lead to a dead end [7]."

This nice, happy, flowery policy is all good, but is it really going to turn out that way? Along with the historical trend of free markets and the movement toward democracy, there is another historical trend that only spells out tension within China. As many countries throughout history have discovered newfound power, they have attempted to expand their political, economic and territorial control. Countries have often had peaceful, benign intentions for doing so, and most importantly, a firm belief in what they were doing was incfact peaceful and benign regardless of world perception. This same trend does apply to China, but due to the country's size is amplified by about a billion percent. China may try and tip-toe around on its rise within the world stage and claim that it is doing so peacefully, but as the nation expands and its interests expand internationally, it creates growing friction on the world stage. Fareed uses the example of Africa to highlight this important point on future international relations.

China is growing, fast. Like any country that experiences growth, the need to secure resources to sustain growth (and in turn, security for the nation itself) usually becomes a pretty high priority. To fulfill this need, China has tried to avoid military conquest and keep in line with its projection of 'a peaceful renaissance' and has actually done a pretty good job, but vitally important world perceptions are changing rapidly as the competition for dwindling resources heats up. Africa has a lot of resources, and a lot of politically unstable and weak governments, many of which are in need of foreign aid. China has recognized this and has invested billions within African governments to cement trade relations and secure stable access to resources, and has gone through great measures to demonstrate to African leaders that its intentions are good for everyone. Fareed mentions a 2006 summit in which 48 African nations attended, where President Hu Jintao cancelled African debt, provide an additional $5 billion in loans and credits, provide training for 15,000 African professionals, increase Aid funding and infrastructure spending to build new hospitals, schools and roads [8]. In general, this seems like it is actually good for everyone, but China is increasingly moving in on spheres of Western influence, which causes tension and friction to develop (This in part, deals with America's role in the post-American world and how crucial it is for Washington to be willing to let other countries become players on the stage...I discussed this point in my second entry for Chapter 2.) China states that it stays out of the domestic affairs of the countries that it is operating in, being a neutral player...but is that really even possible? Oh snap, Rhetorical Question!

On this point, it is very important to acknowledge the foresight of current Chinese leaders. Many of the 'old guard' of the communist party, and even the new generation of Chinese leaders remember well the bitter memories of Mao's mistakes and China's tumultuous past that was the offspring of staunch ideologues. It is the next generation of Chinese leaders that know only a time of peace and stability that has the greatest potential to repeat the mistakes of the past and derail the progress of China's growth.

In its business deals with Zimbabwe, China purchases the raw materials that it needs to sustain itself and in turn, sells weapons and military equipment to Mugabe, which he in turn uses to enforce his will upon domestic opponents and stay in power. The same happens in Sudan, where China is heavily invested and purchases 65% of Sudanese oil exports, and coincidently, Chinese made weapons end up in the hands of militias in Darfur. Their response is that "Business is Business [9]."

Because China is such a main player on the world stage, its dealings with other countries are amplified and in a sense, the dealings that China has with Zimbabwe and Sudan "give them a lifeline, retard progress and in the long run, perpetuate the cycle of bad regimes and social tensions that plague the African continent [9]." Essentially, it is impossible for China to remain a "neutral player" in the affairs of the countries that it is dealing in and this cycle of involvement adds to the increasing tensions on the world stage.

Rather than speak with its wallet as it does in Africa, China has skilfully employed diplomatic tactics to foster a revolution in attitudes over the last two decades within Asia. In 2007, a number of ASEAN (Assoc. of Southeast Asian Nations) members that have traditionally been longstanding regional allies of the United States stated that they trusted China to better wield world power than the United States. This shift in alliances and thinking is crucial to Chinese expansion of influence within the Asian region (especially in regards to its obsession with Taiwan), but is very worrisome to America (again, refer back to Chapter 2.) However, there is a very real danger in the diplomatic relations that Beijing has utilized to improve upon fragile relations in its neighbourhood. "[Beijing's] effort to co-opt nationalism for its own purposes" [10]. As I touched upon earlier, China has moved away from communism, yet Beijing has been reluctant to completely let go of its grip on the country. Acting like a glue to hold everything together, Beijing cultivates the attitude of nationalism when necessary to maintain its grip on the state, an example of which is its relationship toward Japan. Beijing purposefully keeps the relationship tense, recalling wartime behaviour of Japan when needed, refusing to accept Japanese apologies (while still accepting aid money (aka reparations)) and teaching a virulently anti-Japanese version of history in its schooling system [10].

When considering the policy of "a peaceful rise" this simply just does not make sense and only serves to add to the tension that Beijing will face as it moves ever further to a free market system and the looming trend of liberalized democracies (discussed above.) Beijing relies on the heroic image associated with Chairman Mao to help maintain control, as a way to pull the country together but the danger lies in that Beijing has no idea how to actually handle the forces of nationalism that it is fostering...it is unable to reap the seeds of what it has sewn. Beijing has relatively little experience in dealing with NGO's that have a voice and its actions and reactions to these groups are intensely fuelled by fear, paranoia and inexperience. To again fall back on a current example, partly because of the nationalist attitude that Beijing has fostered in the country, Uyghurs groups began to coalesce into one voice and began to exercise the (liberal-democratic) right to speak out. Beijing had no idea how to handle this, freaked out and decided to send in paramilitary groups to "calm things down." Again, this all leads back to the road that Beijing will have to take as globalization and the forces of the rise of the Rest act themselves out within China and the dancefloor of the international stage. Fareed states one very important point that we must take away from all of this. "Economic growth and globalization have made Beijing plan for integration and yet given it the power for military and political confrontation" [11].

We're back on the dancefloor. 'Earth Angel' is still playing and the United States and China are still holding each other at arms length, slowly dancing in endless circles. However, both partners are worried that this is one dance that might not end with a goodnight kiss. The younger and newer generation of Chinese political leaders are seeing that a change in China's political and foreign policy is necessary and China must no longer act to appease Washington, but shift itself so that it may begin to oppose Washington. Thankfully, for the sake of world peace, the forces of integration have won over forces of divergence, but China is taking steps to prove that it is no longer to be considered a secondary player on the world stage and frankly...it means business.

Recall the incident in late 2007 where a Chinese diesel attack submarine surprised a US Naval flotilla in international waters by surfacing (undetected and unannounced) within visual range of the supercarrier USS Kitty Hawk [12]...A tactic reminiscent of Cold War era 'buzzes' of Russian Tupolev bombers on America's northern frontier (Additionally, Russia just recently started this up again by buzzing Canadian airspace with fighter jets while US President Barack Obama was visiting earlier this year.)

In short, it is wise that Beijing and Washington have sought cooperation so far, but it is most probably that China's rise to power will cause some growing pains for Washington and the rest of the Western world and will greatly complicate existing power relations. In keeping with the internal ideals of "the peaceful rise," China is not seeking to become a US style power, armed to the teeth and intolerant of others...a new 'Soviet Union' if you will. Instead, it has sought its own path to modernization and seeks to use its economic strength and a policy of minimal intervention in world affairs in order to subtly manipulate issues so effectively, that the outcome is inevitably in favour of Chinese interests. In avoiding throwing its weight around and instead, acting calmly, asymmetrically and by strengthening economic ties with its neighbours, China is able to slowly grow its influence and push America onto the sidelines of Asia all while more or less staying under America's radar.

Earlier, I mentioned that China was unable to really handle the nationalism it has fostered and is pushing itself into a dangerous new area. By the same token, America is generally unable to handle the quietly positioned economic force that is China, a "new Cold War, but this time with a vibrant market society." China's path to modernization is one that is largely cooperative with world interests, yet one that seeks to undermine Western interests with growing economic and diplomatic prowess. It is a tactic that the West (and specifically America, as it is faced with a shrinking portion of the 'world economic pie') is largely unprepared to deal with and it is this fact that makes America very nervous.

The coming decades are ones that will be shaped by the interactions of and the reactions to these policies and it is, very literally, one that could end very peacefully or very violently.

References:

F. Zakaria The Post-American World, New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 2008

[1] Pp 87-88

[2] Pp 96

[3] Pp 88

[4] N. Klein The Shock Doctrine, London: Penguin Books, 2007. Pp 190 (Billionares calculated in Chinese Yuan).

[5] N. Klein The Shock Doctrine, London: Penguin Books, 2007. Pp 222, Pp 225, Pp 227-228

[6] Pp 102

[7] Pp 107

[8] Pp 117

[9] Pp 118

[10] Pp 121

[11] Pp 123

[12] http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-492804/The-uninvited-guest-Chinese-sub-pops-middle-U-S-Navy-exercise-leaving-military-chiefs-red-faced.html