Fareed spends chapter 5 in a similar fashion to chapter 4, describing how previously established theories of post-Americanism, globalization, nationalism and modernization applied to the 'other' star of the Rest, India. More importantly, Fareed shows that the rise of the Rest and the forces associated with it are not just a blanket term that can be applied to any random country in the non-Western world. On the whole, this chapter shows us that the Rise of the Rest is a truly global movement and that the same forces that act and shape one country will have drastically different results in another.
Fareed, being of Indian descent, starts this chapter off with a personal touch as he describes his own participation in the mass exodus of Indian youth that was taking place in the 1970's and 80's. A dismal domestic situation was a contributing factor to the exodus (brain drain, as all the cool kids called it) of Indian youth during this era, the prior decades marked by mass protests, riots, secessionist movements and armed insurgencies. Economic growth had basically stalled and it seemed that the country was going no where. Many bright minds, Fareed included, believed that the only real shot at a 'meaningful' future lie outside of India and as a result, over 75% of the 1980's graduates of Indian technical institutes emigrated to America [1].
However, strangely the following decade had been a complete 180 degree turn-around from previous decades, with the country enjoying peace, improved international relations, (relative) stability and prosperity. Since i'm writing a blog about post-Americanism, i'm pretty sure you can guess what the base that underpinned the transformation of the 90's in India was. Well folks, if you guessed 'economic reform and an explosion of stable growth initiated and sustained by the global post-American movement' then "A winner is you!" You win a Gold star and a pat on the back! With growth rates at least 6.9% over the decade (and reaching as high as 8.5%) India achieved what we have since seen many other non-Western countries achieve...a massive reduction in poverty and a sociocultural thrust toward modernization and urbanization. In the 21st century, India has been hailed repeatedly as a global beacon, an example of how economic reform should go down in a democratic society...however, with a population of around 1 billion people, India's rise, much like China's, is going to case quite a shadow over the international stage and will probably be felt world wide...So what do we actually make of this? Where is India actually going and what is going to result of their rise in the global order?
At least with China, we have a bit more of a solid idea where things stand (as outlined in Chapter 4) and the fact that we do not yet know the answers to any of the above questions for India is cause for a good degree of worry in Western experts and economists (especially considering the impact that the country's rise will have.) However, we can take solace in the fact that even the Indians themselves do not yet have the answers to these questions. More importantly, that means that they have not yet been answered and in a sense, to some degree we can still influence what the answers to these questions may look like.
I mentioned it briefly in the first paragraph that "the Rise of the Rest" isn't just a blanket term that can be applied to every country. While the forces that are the source for this change are relatively speaking, pretty similar from country to country, the end results that these forces have produced are vastly different across each individual country. For the last 15 years, India has been the second fastest growing economy in the world (right behind good ol' China) however, the economic, political, social and cultural organization of India and China are very different from each other in almost every respect. Through the in depth analysis of these two countries with respect to their aforementioned differences, we can better understand the results of the rise of the Rest and globalization and more importantly, how it may affect each individual country in the global order. From this, we are able to make more accurate predictions and forecasts and essentially, better prepare ourselves for oncoming change in the world order. Fareed doesn't explicitly state this anywhere in his book, but I feel that this is an unspoken objective of his, and the purpose for focusing so dearly and closely on China and India. I also feel pretty strongly that this is an important point to state and realize before reading or analyzing any further. Now that i've got that out of the way though, let us keep on a-truckin'.
China's rise is concrete. It's happening and short of some sort of apocalyptic 'end of days' disaster within China/the world, is unstoppable. India's rise, however, is not as deeply dug in as China's, with a per capita GDP (at the time of publishing, probably outdated by now) of 1/3rd that of China's (~$960 vs. ~$2500 market value, respectively) [2]. Goldman Sachs has made all sorts of wacky predictions about India's future standing in the world economy and that by 2040, it will be the world's third largest economy and by 2050, have a GDP Per Capita more than twenty times its current value [3]. Predictions like this have to be taken with a grain of salt, however, as there are maaaaany variables that can drastically affect the trends that are producing these forecasts (take, for example, the Global 
Recession's impact on worldwide growth trends, a variable that probably was not accounted for at the time of publishing.) Regardless of all this jibber-jabber, India is still growing at a rate faster than Goldman Sachs' trends had forecasted and even with the recession and slowdown, it's probably still growing at a rate faster than most. India also has a few other very important factors going for it that will work to ensure that it is on the leading edge of the rise of the Rest: Its promising demographic profile, the strength of its private sector and the country's former standing within the British Empire. All of these points are slightly complex and intertwined and related, so i'll try to discuss them as best as I can as I ramble on.
Recession's impact on worldwide growth trends, a variable that probably was not accounted for at the time of publishing.) Regardless of all this jibber-jabber, India is still growing at a rate faster than Goldman Sachs' trends had forecasted and even with the recession and slowdown, it's probably still growing at a rate faster than most. India also has a few other very important factors going for it that will work to ensure that it is on the leading edge of the rise of the Rest: Its promising demographic profile, the strength of its private sector and the country's former standing within the British Empire. All of these points are slightly complex and intertwined and related, so i'll try to discuss them as best as I can as I ramble on.In the last chapter, I briefly touched upon the belief that part of China's own success may be attributed to the fact that it is a centrally planned economy that doesn't have to really worry about voters or public opinion, or even the will of the people. Fareed builds upon my own statement (it's almost like he and I are on the same wavelength or something) with a number of examples that serve to contrast some of the economic successes of both countries as they pertain to government. The Chinese government can assert its own will upon the people of the country pretty easily and in that sense, especially compared with a socialist-ish democracy like India, the government is pretty strong. The Three Gorges Dam in China flooded an area of around 39 square kilometres and displaced almost 1.25 million people and basically, all the Chinese government had to do was say "Yo, we're building a giant dam here...so you can either move or drown. We'll help you move...but you don't really have a choice here." China also restricts the movement of its citizens so that they cannot migrate to a city until they have proof of a job...preventing the formation of slums [4]. If a non-Authoritarian state like India tried to enact policies like this, there would be revolutions, uprisings of epic proportions and the blood (of civil officials) running in the streets. In contrast to the top-down and planned/dictated growth of China, India's own growth has been initiated from the bottom of society upward, uncontrolled, messy and chaotic and more or less without the help of the 'weak' government. 
A tremendous strength of the Indian system is, as Fareed describes it, "[its] Human Capital [5]." Proportionately, a large segment of India's population are 'youth' and this 'surplus' of young workers (as opposed to the declining of the population of Russia, aging population of Japan, and proportonately smaller portion of youth in China) are a valuable asset to the strength of the Indian economy. Additionally, this workforce contains a vast and growing number of business-savvy and friendly individuals; entrepreneurs, managers and technicians. This is due in part to the years of being "the jewel" of the British Empire. As a result of being dominated by (and not just dominated, but the focal point of Imperial ambitions well into the Industrial era) the British Empire, the Indian population is much more familiar to the trends and traditions of the West and of their business practices (much more so than China, Saudi Arabia or South Africa.) It might be an unfair generalization, perhaps even a politically incorrect one...but that does not change the fact that it's true. This highlights a complete shift in mentality of the average Indian citizen...perhaps to the point that the India that Fareed grew up in could be considered a completely different country. This strength has led Indian led firms and businesses to have a distinct advantage in the global market and it is interesting to observe that Indian investment in Western countries is in many cases greater than Western investment in India. In Short, it is the familiarity with English and the choppy waters of Western business practices (without the need for translators or guides) that is the most important and lasting legacy of the rule of the British Empire over India and an important characteristic of India's past that has contributed to their success now. As Fareed puts it, "They speak globalization fluently [5]."
I did briefly mention the strength of the private sector within India and what it has done for the country without the help or support of the government. It's December 26th, 2004. I worked in a clothing store at that point in my life, So I was at work at about 6am and there till a solid 11pm. I distinctly remember over the following few days hearing about the devastating tsunami that had occurred in the Southeast-Asian area of the world and the truey staggering numbers of dead and persons who were missing or unaccounted for. During this time, all that the Indian government (in all of its weakness) would be good for would be asking for and coordinating foreign aid. The response to this event however, was vastly different. Fareed points out that the people and corporations of India opened up and within two weeks, citizens had privately donated over $80 million dollars in relief money. Since that time, Azim Premji, the 'Bill Gates' of India, has announced he will leave the vast majority of his fortune (valued at $14.8 billion in 2006 US Dollars) to a charitable organization (ala the 'Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.) Similar actions are occurring all throughout the Indian subcontinent, with more than 25% of schools and 80% of the health care system funded by the private entity and outside the state sector [6]. Fareed makes a very interesting comparison that perhaps may serve to answer the questions posed at the end of the 3rd paragraph of this post. This system resembles, more than any other in the post-American, non-Western world, that of the United States in that society has completely overpowered and asserted its dominance over the state. The formula has proved pretty successful for America...but can the same be said India?
Just as Beijing has a challenge that is paramount to the success or failure of the state in its transfer to post-Americanism, New Delhi too has a central challenge that it must confront and successfully weather in order to truly move to post-Americanism. Government does matter and India again benefits from the years of British colonial rule in this area as well. When India gained independence in 1947, many of its institutions (such as a central bank) and controlling rhetoric were already established and thoroughly modern. However, it is the very nature of the openness of democracy that creates challenges for the reform of India. As I mentioned earlier, China is very top-down. The state commands and the people do as instructed, and there is little else to say on the matter. When it comes to restructuring a society, especially in the context of economics, there are often those who will be hurt or affected negatively to some degree by the restructuring. The very nature of democracy...equal representation, open discussion and political accountability, the cornerstones of the inherited system that does give India many advantages, are also the biggest obstacles to full on economic success in India. To put it in different terms, the "One step forward and three quarters of a step backward" nature of democracy serves to slow down the pace of reform and in many cases (as mentioned in Chapter 4) cause law makers to act in ways that are detrimental to long term economic success. It's important to state that the booming private sector in India would not be possible without the presence of a heavily regulated and controlled stock market and processes of government intervention (de-regulation and re-regulation, etc.) Much as the controlled loosening of Beijing's grip on China will define the success of that country and more importantly, the relative peacefulness at which China will enter the post-American world, the weathering of the challenges of democracy by a hesitant ruling class and its relations toward a society eager for change will be the central hurdle and definition of post-American success for India.
I find this point one of the most interesting aspects of the post-American global transformation, that countries who have long utilized systems of government that are ideological opposites to the democratic shift of globalization tend to fare better than those who begin with an ideological system closer to that of the end product (capitalism or at the very least, a democratic socialist system.) This has been a trait recognized in the circles of economic scholars longer than it has in the public domain. It's easy to look back on the policies enacted by Boris Yeltsin, Margaret Thatcher or the leaders of Poland's 'Solidarity' movement as their own countries started to face economic restructuring and reform and it's even easier to condemn those leaders for the often brutal methods in which they instituted and enforced their policies, often suspending civil liberties, creating a state of terror, launching proxy wars and more or less operating in a 'democracy-free zone' to get things done. However, when one recognizes that democracy by its very nature faces greater initial obstacles and challenges to success than command directed systems...is it as easy to condemn these leaders? When looking inward, one has to 
ask themselves what the alternative would have been... Would you act the same in their position? It's obvious that India is taking a far less aggressive approach to conventional economic theory, rejecting the standardized Western/Washington Consensus approach and yet, they're faced with their own troubles and obstacles and while the devastation may not be as...shocking or upfront as it was in Chile under Pinochet, there is still a large amount of suffering and devastation within the country as a result of economic change (Slum development, for example...can draw back in part to economic restructuring, although it's incorrect to state economics as the only cause.) Makes you think.
ask themselves what the alternative would have been... Would you act the same in their position? It's obvious that India is taking a far less aggressive approach to conventional economic theory, rejecting the standardized Western/Washington Consensus approach and yet, they're faced with their own troubles and obstacles and while the devastation may not be as...shocking or upfront as it was in Chile under Pinochet, there is still a large amount of suffering and devastation within the country as a result of economic change (Slum development, for example...can draw back in part to economic restructuring, although it's incorrect to state economics as the only cause.) Makes you think.I'd just like to steal a point that Fareed makes in order to tie back to my own statements in Chapter 3 about the rise of the Rest and what that means for the global world. "India is diverging not only from its own path but also from the paths of other countries in Asia (...) It is a noisy democracy that has finally empowered its people economically [7]." From this, we see that India is again carving out its own path toward modernization and it is infact a path that is very different from that of its neighbours (many of which are far more centrally organized) yet combining some elements of Western ideals (pro-private sector) while still combining elements that are traditionally and wholly Indian. Just something I thought i'd point out. It goes without saying that this method will be further affected and enriched by the Hindu worldview and the geopolitics of India (regional governments, access to nuclear arms, and so on.)
Anywho, let us move on.
In as much a sense as Beijing is viewed in American circles as a source of future opposition toward Washington and its sphere of influence, New Delhi is viewed as a potential friend (hence, the naming of chapters 4 and 5.)
Fareed references a 2005 Pew Global Attitudes study that showed that 71% of Indians polled had a favourable impression of the United States of America (second only to the USA itself, with 83% in favour.) What this means is that Indians are, on the whole, very comfortable with America and elements of Americanism (globalization, etc) [8]. Fareed states that this in part is due to the fact that for years, the post-Independence Indian government had attempted to make anti-American rhetoric a backbone of its national policies. Simply put, America feels more comfortable with India and vice versa largely because as Fareed states, there is a much deeper understanding between the two countries than between America and other non-Western countries. I'm going to quote Fareed at length here because he has very, very eloquently illustrated his point in a method that one cannot top: "[Americans] are puzzled and disturbed by impenetrable decision-making elites like the Chinese Politburo or the Iranian Council of Guardians. But a quarrelsome democracy that keeps moving backward, forward and sideways-that [Americans] understand" [9]. Like with Britain and Israel, America has developed a relationship that goes much deeper than strategy with the Indians and that relationship has evolved into an almost constant partnership and understanding between the two. There may still very well be friction between the two governments on any number of issues, especially as India continues to expand and cast a shadow over world affairs, but for the time being, the warm relationship between New Delhi and Washington (as opposed to a cold relationship between Beijing and Washington) will become increasingly important on the world scale as the rise of the Rest continues and the world shifts from uni-polarity.
References:
F. Zakaria The Post-American World, New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc,. 2008
[1] Pp 129
[2] Pp 132
[3] Dominic Wilson and Roopa Purushothaman, Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050 (Goldman Sachs, Global Economics Paper no. 99, Oct. 1, 2003).
[4] Pp 134
[5] Pp 135
[6] Pp 139
[7] Pp 138
[8] Pp 150
[9] Pp 151
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